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I. INTRODUCTION
HE most noteworthy changes to Texas business corporation and lim-
ited liability company law during the Survey period' arose from the
activities of the Seventy-Third Texas Legislature. The passage of
House Bill 1239, which became effective on September 1, 1993, brought nu-
merous changes to the Texas Business Corporation Act (TBCA) and the
Texas Limited Liability Company Act (TLLCA).2 The Texas and federal
courts also decided a number of interesting corporation law issues during the
period. Section II of this article addresses the more interesting judicial deci-
sions and legislative actions affecting Texas corporation law; Section III fo-
* J.D., M.L.A., Southern Methodist University; Attorney at Law, Malouf Lynch Jack-
son Kessler & Collins, P.C., Dallas, Texas.
** J.D., M.B.A., Southern Methodist University; C.P.A., Attorney at Law, Malouf
Lynch Jackson Kessler & Collins, P.C., Dallas, Texas.
The authors wish to thank Karen G. Shropshire for her assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. October 1, 1992 through September 30, 1993.
2. See Act of May 7, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 215, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 420, 461
(Vernon). The changes in House Bill 1239 were recommended by the Texas Business Law
Foundation, a group that suggests improvements in and changes to the Texas business laws in
order to "enhance the state's business climate and economic development." HOUSE RE-
SEARCH ORGANIZATION, DAILY FLOOR REPORT, Tex. H.B. 1239, at 23 (Apr. 13, 1993). The
legislature also made significant amendments to the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act. See
Act of May 24, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 733, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 2876 (Vernon).
Although the non-profit corporation statute is not addressed in this article, practitioners who
deal with such entities are encouraged to review the amendments in detail.
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cuses on the substantial amendments to the TLLCA as well as related
federal income tax and foreign-state qualification issues.
II. CORPORATIONS
Several decisions handed down during the survey period dealt with mat-
ters of corporate disregard, the individual liability of shareholders, directors,
and officers, the business judgment rule, the right to appeal after dissolution,
and federal class actions. These decisions are discussed in Part A below.
Part B summarizes the more significant amendments to the TBCA as a re-
sult of the passage of House Bill 1239.3 Readers should keep in mind that
the cases discussed in this article were all decided prior to the effective date
of the 1993 amendment to TBCA Article 2.21, dealing with the liability of




Houston Cable TV, Inc. v. Inwood W Civic Ass'n 5 involved a review of
whether the trial court correctly determined that four cable television com-
panies were, as a matter of law, the alter egos of one another. The court of
appeals affirmed, noting that the evidence established that the companies
acted as one entity in dealing with customers. 6 The court pointed out that
the different bases for disregard of the corporate fiction involved fact ques-
tions ordinarily determined by a jury, but where the material facts are undis-
puted, the application of the alter ego doctrine becomes a question of law.7
Seventeen homeowner associations brought suit against Houston Cable
TV, Inc., Warner Cable Communications, Inc., Warner Cable Communica-
tions of Harris County, Inc., and Warner Communications, Inc. (collec-
tively, Houston Cable) for breach of contract, fraud, tortious interference,
and other causes of action. The facts showed that, beginning in 1979, Hous-
ton Cable executed right-of-way agreements with approximately 150 associa-
tions to allow cable lines to be laid on their easements. As consideration,
Houston Cable agreed to pay the associations two to three percent of gross
revenues. In 1986, Houston Cable decided that it no longer wanted to pay
the amounts due under the agreements because the expense exceeded
$300,000 per year. To avoid a confrontation with the associations, Houston
Cable sent letters falsely stating that recent federal legislation precluded the
distribution of further payments. Seventeen of the associations discovered
the truth and brought suit.
On appeal, Houston Cable asserted that the associations did not exclu-
3. See Act of May 7, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 215, §§ 2.01-2.21, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 420 (Vernon) (amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 1.02-10.03) [hereinafter
TBCA Amendments].
4. See infra text and accompanying notes 153-65.
5. 839 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ dism'd by agr.).
6. Id. at 500-02.
7. Id. at 500.
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sively establish that the Houston Cable entities were the alter egos of one
another. The court stated that Houston Cable not only breached the con-
tracts but committed a tort in the process;8 thus, "special circumstances"
existed to support the trial court's application of the alter ego doctrine as a
matter of law.9
The record indicated that Houston Cable TV, Inc. was a wholly owned
subsidiary of Warner Cable Communications, Inc., which was a wholly
owned subsidiary of Warner Communications, Inc. Houston Cable TV rep-
resented to certain of the homeowner groups that it was affiliated with
Warner Communications. Further, letters sent to the associations showed
the company name as Houston Cable TV, Inc./Warner-Amex. One Warner
Cable executive testified that Warner Cable'was involved in the day-to-day
operations of Houston Cable TV, Inc. He answered questions in the context
of "Warner Cable" as if the Warner Cable and Houston TV corporations
were one entity. Further, he testified that "there's an awful lot of companies
involved here and I'm unclear as to them."' 10 In addition, the president and
general manager of Warner Cable testified that "we operate under Warner
Cable. It's not a legal entity."" He further stated that Warner Cable "is the
umbrella of the operation, whatever legal entity it is.' 2
The associations presented evidence that they thought they were dealing
with one Warner Cable entity, and the testimony of the cable executives
proved that the associations were correct. 13 The trial court determined that
because the companies were the alter egos of one another, a judgment
against one constituted a judgment against all; thus, separate jury findings
against each company were not necessary. 14 The court of appeals agreed. 15
Interestingly, the reported decision did not make reference to which of the
corporations executed the contracts in question or which entity received the
gross revenues used to calculate the $300,000 annual payment due the home-
owner associations.
In Subway Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Sims,16 the Fifth Circuit addressed
whether the debtors of three related corporations could use the alter ego
theory, alleging that the corporations were not separate entities for bank-
ruptcy filing purposes, to block the corporations' efforts to put the debtors
into involuntary bankruptcy. 17 The three related corporations filed petitions
instituting separate involuntary proceedings against Earl Sims and his wife
Dorothy (the Debtors), the owners of four sandwich shop franchises. The
couple moved to dismiss the petitions on the basis of bad faith filing. The
bankruptcy court faced the issue of whether the creditor corporations had
8. Id.




13. Id. at 502.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 994 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1993).
17. Id. at 218.
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satisfied the requirements of Section 303(b)(1) of the United States Bank-
ruptcy Code, providing that if a debtor has twelve or more creditors, an
involuntary petition may be filed by three or more entities that hold bona
fide, non-contingent claims against the debtor. 18 The Debtors contended
that the three corporations were the alter egos of the franchisor, Doctor's
Associates, Inc. (DAI), and thus should qualify as only one entity for pur-
poses of Section 303.
The bankruptcy court denied Debtors' motions to dismiss and entered or-
ders for relief in both proceedings. Debtors appealed to the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which reversed the
bankruptcy court. The creditor corporations then appealed the district
court decision to the Fifth Circuit, which reversed and held that the bank-
ruptcy court had correctly concluded that the creditor corporations were not
the alter egos of DAI19
In addressing the alter ego issue, the Fifth Circuit found that the Bank-
ruptcy Code was silent as to whether the separate identity of a corporate
creditor should be disregarded for purposes of Section 303, and found no
cases in which the separate identity of a petitioning corporate creditor had
been disregarded. 20 After reviewing the few cases it found to have addressed
the issue, the court concluded that "ordinary principles of corporation law
apply in determining whether related entities will be combined for [Bank-
ruptcy Code] § 303(b)(1) purposes."' 2 1
The court noted that one of the fundamental purposes for the creation of a
corporation is to provide an entity separate from its owners, thus limiting
the personal liability of those owners. 22 Further, the court wrote that
[t]he various theories for piercing the corporate veil have been created
for the purpose of disregarding that separate legal identity in situations
where equity demands it, such as when the owners have misused the
corporate form, or have established it for a fraudulent purpose or to
commit an illegal act. Another exception arises where ...a parent
company totally dominates and controls its subsidiary, operating the
subsidiary as its business conduit or agent. 23
The court stated that "the alter ego doctrine and piercing of the corporate
veil are truly exceptional doctrines" 24 which should be reserved for cases
where the officers, directors, or stockholders used the corporation as "a
sham to perpetuate a fraud, to shun personal liability, or to encompass other
truly unique situations."'25
The Fifth Circuit noted that in determining whether the three creditor
corporations were the alter egos of DAI, the district court had applied the
18. See 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (1988).
19. 994 F.2d at 222.
20. Id. at 215.
21. Id. at 217.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 217-18 (citation omitted).




"laundry list" of factors enumerated in United States v. Jon-T Chemicals,
Inc. 26 The court found that the district court had failed to consider crucial
distinctions between the instant case and Jon-T, and held that the district
court had inappropriately applied the Jon-T analysis. 27 The distinctions ar-
ticulated by the court were that the Debtors were not seeking to hold DAI
liable for any debts owed to them by the creditor corporations, and that "in
contract cases, fraud is an essential element of an alter ego finding."' 28 The
Fifth Circuit concluded that in the absence of a finding of fraud, "the alter
ego doctrine is inapplicable in a case in which the claims sound in contract
rather than tort."'29
In Kern v. Gleason,30 a mandamus proceeding before the Amarillo Court
of Appeals, discovery of a shareholder's personal financial information was
limited even though the claimants sought recovery of exemplary damages
based on theories of corporate disregard. The court noted that "piercing the
corporate veil is not a separate cause of action but a means of imposing
individual liability where it would not otherwise exist" and that the various
corporate disregard theories are only remedial measures for expanding po-
tential sources of recovery. 3'
In the underlying action, two sisters brought suit against Texas Health
Enterprises, Inc. (Texas Health), the operator of several nursing homes.
They alleged that in November 1987, while residents of a nursing home op-
erated by Texas Health, they were attacked by a former employee who had
previously been convicted of a felony. Plaintiffs sought damages arising
from Texas Health's negligence, intentional torts, deceptive trade practices,
and breach of a duty of good faith, and plead for exemplary damages under
several theories. Further, they alleged that Texas Health was synonymous
with Peter Kern, the sole shareholder on the date of the alleged attack, and
26. 768 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. 1985). The factors used in Jon-T for evaluating whether the
corporate form should be disregarded included whether:
(1) the parent and the subsidiary have common stock ownership;
(2) the parent and the subsidiary have common directors or officers;
(3) the parent and the subsidiary have common business departments;
(4) the parent and the subsidiary file consolidated financial statements and tax
returns;
(5) the parent finances the subsidiary;
(6) the parent caused the incorporation of the subsidiary;
(7) the subsidiary operates with grossly inadequate capital;
(8) the parent pays the salaries and other expenses of the subsidiary;
(9) the subsidiary receives no business except that given to it by the parent;
(10) the parent uses the subsidiary's property as its own;
(11) the daily operations of the two corporations are not kept separate; and
(12) the subsidiary does not observe the basic corporate formalities, such as
keeping separate books and records and holding shareholder and board
meetings.
Id. at 691-92.
27. 994 F.2d at 219.
28. Id. at 218.
29. Id. at 219. Thus, federal common law on the alter ego issue appears to be fundamen-
tally consistent with TBCA Article 2.21 § A, as amended. See infra text accompanying notes
153-165.
30. 840 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, orig. proceeding).
31. Id. at 736.
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requested that the separate identity of the corporation be disregarded. 32
The trial court entered an order compelling Kern to produce numerous
records reflecting his personal financial condition since January 1, 1987, in-
cluding federal income tax returns and supporting schedules. Kern and
Texas Health petitioned the court of appeals for mandamus relief, requesting
that the trial judge be directed to set aside the discovery order. Kern at-
tacked the discovery order on the grounds that its requests were irrelevant,
overly broad, unduly burdensome, harassing, duplicitous, and not calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. 33 He further asserted that
production of such sensitive financial information would invade his pri-
vacy. 34 The court granted the relief, reasoning that Kern had no adequate
remedy on appeal because once the records were inspected and reproduced,
a subsequent holding that the trial court had mistakenly issued the order
would not cure the error.35
The record indicated that Kern was the sole shareholder of Texas Health
on the day the plaintiffs were attacked, and that he owned about 120 nursing
home leaseholds through various corporations. He also owned majority in-
terests in several health management corporations, one of which performed
accounting and payroll functions for the nursing homes. Kern testified that
the nursing home administrators and field personnel managed the homes on
a day-to-day basis. 36
In analyzing the case, the court found that the sisters correctly contended
that they were entitled to discover evidence of net worth because they al-
leged grounds for the recovery of exemplary damages.37 The sisters further
contended that because Kern might be liable for exemplary damages along
with Texas Health, discovery of his net worth, as well as that of Texas
Health, was appropriate. 38 Because the record established that Kern was
not involved in the daily operations of the nursing home where the attack
occurred and had committed no acts or omissions outside his corporate posi-
32. Id. at 732. Plaintiffs alleged that the separate identity of Texas Health should be
disregarded because:
(a) Texas Health was the alter ego of Peter Kern;
(b) Texas Health had been used as a sham to perpetuate actual or constructive
fraud;
(c) Texas Health was being used as a means for evading existing legal obliga-
tions;
(d) Texas Health was relied upon to justify a wrong;
(e) Texas Health was inadequately capitalized;
(f) Kern had denuded Texas Health for his personal gain;
(g) Kern was directly liable to the sisters under the trust fund doctrine; and
(h) Kern's total personal control over the operations of Texas Health lead to
the conclusion that he knowingly participated in the tortious and fraudu-
lent acts giving rise to the action.
Id.
33. Id. at 734.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 735.




tion with respect to the sisters, the court held that he could not be liable for
any tort, deceptive trade practice, or breach of good faith. 39 The court
stated that if the plaintiffs succeeded in their causes of action, the liability
would be that of the corporation, not Kern.4°
The sisters argued that their request to discover evidence of Kern's net
worth was permissible to prove that the corporate veil of Texas Health
should be pierced. The court responded that the sisters were "fishing in the
wrong hole,"' 41 and pointed out that Kern received income from several
sources unrelated to Texas Health. 42 Thus, his net worth was immaterial to
whether Texas Health's corporate character should be disregarded. 43 In
weighing the need for Kern's tax returns against his right to privacy, the
court held that the sisters should first examine the corporation's records for
the evidence they sought."
The sisters also claimed that under the trust fund theory, whereby a con-
structive trust is imposed on distributed corporate assets, the location and
nature of Kern's assets were relevant to determining whether such assets had
been acquired with funds belonging to Texas Health. 45 The court wrote that
the trust fund doctrine "permits an unpaid creditor of a dissolved corpora-
tion to pursue assets distributed to its shareholders or third parties on the
theory that an equitable lien will burden the transferred property. '46 Since
Texas Health had not been dissolved and the sisters were not yet creditors,
the court held that the sisters could not rely on the trust fund doctrine to
secure the information they sought.47
2. Individual Liability of Shareholders, Directors, and Officers
In Portlock v. Perry48 the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether
summary judgment evidence established that the non-physician president of
a radiological diagnostic corporation could be held personally liable for
damages resulting from the lethal administration of sedatives by corporate
employees. The court concluded that the officer could not be held liable,
based on the pleadings and evidence presented.
Four-year-old Erica Portlock was taken by her parents to the Duncanville
Diagnostic Center (DDC) for a routine radiological examination. After she
39. Id.
40. Id. The court and the parties appeared to treat all of the sisters' claims as theories of
corporate disregard. The court did not address the issue of whether some of the sisters' allega-
tions constituted separate causes of action. See, e.g., Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d
270, 271 n.l (Tex. 1986) (stating that doctrines similar yet distinct from theories of corporate
disregard include fraudulent conveyance, the trust fund doctrine, and the denuding theory).




45. Id. at 738.
46. Id. For a discussion of the trust fund doctrine and its development under Delaware
law, see Alan W. Tompkins, Directors' Duties to Corporate Creditors: Delaware and the Insol-
vency Exception, 47 SMU L. REV. 165, 171 (1993).
47. Id.
48. 852 S.W.2d 578 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied).
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became anxious, the DDC radiologist ordered the radiological technicians to
sedate her with chloral hydrate. The dosage was miscalculated and exces-
sive; Erica died later that day. Erica's parents sued DDC, the radiologist,
and the technicians on theories of negligence and medical malpractice. The
Portlocks later amended their petition to include Kenneth Perry, the presi-
dent of DDC, as an individual defendant. The Portlocks alleged, among
other things, that Perry failed to ensure that adequate safety procedures
were in place for the supervision of DDC employees administering danger-
ous narcotics and that Perry was negligent in hiring certain DDC manage-
rial employees. The two employees in question were responsible for the
daily operations of the center, but neither was licensed as a physician nor
experienced in providing patient-care services.
The Portlocks settled their claims against the radiologist, and the court
dismissed DDC and the technicians from the lawsuit. Perry moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that because he was an officer of the corporation, he
could not be held personally liable for Erica's death. The trial court granted
Perry's motion. On appeal, the Portlocks contended that summary judg-
ment was inappropriate because Perry's failure to institute safety policies
and procedures at DDC, as well as his affirmative acts of negligently hiring
inexperienced managerial personnel, constituted direct participation in Er-
ica's death because such actions proximately caused her death. 49
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the summary judgment for Perry
and held, as a matter of law, that he had no duty to institute safety policies
and procedures at DDC.50 The court so held because nothing in the record
indicated that Perry undertook an affirmative act to institute such policies
and procedures, nor was otherwise required to do so, as an officer of the
corporation. 5' Absent any such duties, Perry's omissions did not constitute
participation in the child's death. 52 The court concluded that there was "no
causal connection between Perry's negligent hiring, if any, of [the manage-
ment personnel] and Erica Portlock's death because the Portlocks neither
pled nor offered summary judgment proof that [the radiologist] or the tech-
nologists who administered the drug were negligently hired."' 53 Further, the
court found that Perry could not have anticipated the dangers to the Por-
tlocks by hiring the DDC management personnel because he did not hire
them to provide medical services to patients. 54
This holding provoked a sharp dissent. Justice Maloney noted that the
record indicated that Perry approved the hiring of the full-time on-site man-
ager even though he knew nothing of the manager's background and never
inquired as to whether he had any health care expertise.5 5 Further, evidence
had been introduced indicating that Perry had the ultimate authority to




53. Id. at 583.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 586.
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make decisions for DDC, but that neither Perry nor the managers had ever
inquired as to whether adequate safety procedures existed.5 6 Maloney ar-
gued that a properly instructed jury could have found that Perry's actions
were a proximate cause of Erica's injuries, and concluded that the majority
had decided issues as a matter of law which were "precisely the issues that
should be resolved by a trier of fact."' 57
In Holloway v. Skinner 58 a corporate officer, director, and shareholder
was held personally liable for tortious interference in certain contracts
breached by the corporation. In 1981, Skinner, the owner of a sandwich-
shop franchise, agreed to contribute his business to a new corporation to be
owned by him, Holloway, and Holloway's father-in-law. In return, Skinner
received a job, a promissory note, and the right to certain royalty payments
from the corporation. Holloway served as president of the corporation and
owned approximately forty percent of its outstanding shares.
From 1981 to 1984, the corporation paid Skinner only a portion of the
amounts owed to him and, predictably, relations between Skinner and Hol-
loway deteriorated. When Skinner quit his job with the corporation in 1984,
Holloway's annual salary was $24,000; by 1986, Holloway's annual salary
exceeded $44,000. During the period in which Holloway's salary was in-
creasing at such a brisk pace, the corporation defaulted on its obligations to
Skinner. Skinner sued for breach of contract and secured a favorable judg-
ment in June, 1986, but the judgment remained unsatisfied because the cor-
poration filed for bankruptcy shortly thereafter.
Skinner then sued Holloway, claiming that he had tortiously interfered
with Skinner's contracts with the corporation and forced the entity to de-
fault. The jury found for Skinner, awarding actual and punitive damages.59
Holloway appealed, contending that, as the president, a director, and a
shareholder of the corporation, he could not have interfered with the con-
tracts as a matter of law. 6° Alternatively, Holloway argued that he was im-
mune from personal liability because of his status as an agent of the
corporation. 61
The Austin Court of Appeals cited Maxey v. Citizens Nat'l Bank 62 for the
proposition that "an officer or director may not be held liable in damages for
inducing the corporation to violate a contractual obligation, provided that
the officer or director acts in good faith and believes that what he does is for
the best interests of the corporation. ' 63 The court of appeals inferred from
that language that when a corporate officer or director acts against the inter-
ests of the corporation, for their own pecuniary benefit,-or with an intent to
harm the plaintiff by inducing the breach of a contract, that officer or direc-
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 860 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.App.-Austin 1993, writ requested).
59. Id. at 219.
60. Id. at 220.
61. Id.
62. 507 S.W.2d 722, 726 (Tex. 1974).
63. 860 S.W.2d at 220.
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tor can be held liable to the injured party for tortious interference with a
contractual relationship. 64
After acknowledging that Texas courts have allowed absolute immunity
for officers and directors whose interests are so closely aligned with those of
the corporation as to be "incapable of separation, '65 the court held that Hol-
loway, as a forty-percent shareholder, "lacked that unity of financial interest
which would warrant considering him the same entity as [the corpora-
tion],' 66 and denied his claim for immunity. 67 The court confirmed that
corporate agents who "knowingly participate in a tortious act may be held
individually liable without the need to pierce the corporate veil." '68
Holloway also contended that even if he had interfered with the corpora-
tion's contracts with Skinner, he was, as a matter of law, privileged in doing
so as a bona fide exercise of his rights as president, director, and shareholder
of the corporation. 69 The court noted that once a plaintiff has established a
prima facie case of tortious interference, the burden shifts to the defendant
to show that the conduct was justified. 70 Holloway had received an adverse
jury finding as to the justification for his conduct; 7 1 thus, the court of appeals
reviewed the record for evidence tending to support that finding. 72 The
court found that the substantial increase in Holloway's salary, at the time of
the corporation's default on other obligations, could be evidence to support
an inference that Holloway used his position in the corporation to "derive a
direct, personal, pecuniary benefit at the expense of the corporation's ex-
isting financial obligations to a creditor."'73 The court also noted that
although the weight of a defendant's burden is slight in showing that the
breach of a corporate obligation was in good faith, "Holloway failed to meet
that burden."'74
Holloway relied on his status as an agent of the corporation, rather than
on evidence that he acted in good faith, to justify his inducement of the
corporation's breach of its contracts as a matter of law. 75 The court noted
that "the only status that can assure immunity from tortious-interference
liability is defendant's total ownership of the corporation, '76 and deferred to
the jury's determination that the evidence did not support Holloway's claim
of legal justification. 77
Another case involving the tortious conduct of corporate officers was State
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 221.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 222.
70. Id. at 220.
71. Id. at 222.
72. Id.







v. Malone Service Co. ,78 which involved an action by the Texas attorney gen-
eral against Malone Service Company (MSC) for alleged violations of the
Texas Water Code. MSC, a Texas corporation, operated a hazardous waste
disposal plant under a permit issued pursuant to the terms of the Texas
Water Code. MSC's president and plant manager were also named as indi-
vidual defendants in the action. 79 At trial, the jury assessed more than $3
million in penalties against the defendants for groundwater contamination
and the unauthorized dumping of hazardous wastes.80
On appeal, MSC contended that because it was the owner of the permit,
rather than the individual defendants, the individuals could not be held per-
sonally liable.8' MSC argued that the relevant provision of the Water
Code8 2 does not impose liability on a "person" who does not own the per-
mit, even though such person acts as an agent or abettor in the violation.
MSC relied upon a case in which the term "person" was interpreted to im-
pose liability only on "principals" in the context of the Texas usury
statute. 83
The court rejected this argument, stating that "[w]hile usury has 'a con-
tractual flavor,' an environmental tort is more analogous to a situation in
which a corporate officer who participates in or directs the commission of a
tort may be held personally liable."'8 4 The court cited a number of federal
environmental cases which applied the "personal participation" doctrine to
persons who are not permit holders,8 5 and held that the individual defend-
ants were liable as a result of their actions rather than their status as agents
of the corporation.8 6
Davis v. State8 7 involved a suit by the Texas attorney general to recover
unpaid franchise taxes, penalties, and interest from the sole shareholder and
78. 853 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1993, writ denied).
79. Id. at 83.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 84.
82. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 27.101(a) (Vernon 1988). This section provides that
"[a] person who violates any provision of ... a permit issued under this chapter shall be
subject to a civil penalty in any sum not exceeding $5,000 for each day of noncompliance and
for each act of noncompliance." Id.
83. 853 S.W.2d at 85. The usury statute provides that any person who contracts for,
charges or receives interest greater than what is authorized by statute shall forfeit an amount
equal to three times the amount of the usurious interest. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-1.06 (Vernon 1988). The case cited for the proposition that the liability of a "person"
should be limited to "principals" only was Wartman v. Empire Loan Co., 101 S.W. 499, 500-
01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1909, no writ).
84. 853 S.W.2d at 85.
85. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 1984).
86. 853 S.W.2d at 85. Cases decided during the survey period confirmed that a corpora-
tion may be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages when (1) it authorizes the perform-
ance of a tortious act, (2) it recklessly employs an unfit person who commits such an act, (3) it
ratifies or approves such an act, or (4) a managerial employee commits such an act in the scope
of employment. See Borden, Inc. v. Rios, 850 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993,
writ dism'd by agr.) (holding that an exemplary damage award of more than $3 million in
favor of defamed former employee was not excessive); Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Lieck,
845 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ granted) (affirming damage award for
malicious prosecution).
87. 846 S.W.2d 564 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, no writ).
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director of Ad Agency, Inc. (AAI). The Texas Tax Code provides that
when corporate privileges are forfeited for the failure to file a report or pay a
tax or penalty, each director and officer is liable for the debts of the corpora-
tion which arise after the date the report, tax, or penalty was due and before
the date on which the corporate privileges are revived.8 8 Such liabilities in-
clude franchise taxes and penalties which become due and payable after the
date of forfeiture. 89
The State sought to hold Davis personally liable for AAI's tax debt by
alleging that Davis was the alter ego of AAI, that Davis operated AAI as a
sham to perpetrate a fraud on creditors, and that Davis, as a director of the
corporation, was liable under the Tax Code provisions referenced above. Af-
ter limited discovery, both Davis and the State moved for summary judg-
ment. The trial court granted the State's motion and awarded joint and
several relief from AAI and Davis.
Davis appealed, arguing that there was no summary judgment proof that
AAI was his alter ego or that he operated the corporation as a sham to
perpetrate a fraud. The State admitted in its brief that its summary judg-
ment motion had not been based on either theory; thus, the appellate court
noted that the Tax Code provided the only basis under which Davis could be
held personally liable.
In his motion for summary judgment, Davis alleged that AAI's corporate
privileges were forfeited on June 24, 1985. The court of appeals held the
allegation to be a formal judicial admission, conclusively establishing the
date of forfeiture.90 As proof for its summary judgment motion, the State
had attached a certified claim for Texas franchise taxes from the comptrol-
ler. The claim recited that AAI failed to pay franchise taxes when due, that
its privileges had been forfeited, that taxes were due for an audit covering the
years 1983-1986, and that the claim's tax summary was "for the year
1986." Importantly, the claim did not recite the date on which the
franchise taxes were due.
Noting that two annual tax periods were included within the calendar year
1986, the Austin Court of Appeals found the term "1986," as used in the
comptroller's claim, to be susceptible to more than one meaning. 92 The stat-
utory tax period ran from May 1 through April 30; franchise taxes for the
1986 period came due on March 15, 1985.93 Thus, a portion of the taxes for
the calendar year 1986 came due on March 15, 1985, and the remainder
were due on March 15, 1986. Because AAI's corporate privileges were for-
feited more than three months after the date on which the 1986 franchise
taxes came due, the court noted that Davis could not be held personally
liable for the 1986 statutory tax period liability. 94 Further, because it could
88. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.255(a) (West 1992).
89. Id.




94. Id. at 568-69.
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not be determined whether the 1986 tax summary contained in the comp-
troller's claim referred to a statutory or calendar period, the court found that
a genuine issue of material fact existed.95
Next, the State argued that a jeopardy determination notice issued to AAI
in October 1987 established, as a matter of law, that the tax liability for the
1983-1986 audit period became due in 1987-two years after AAI's privi-
leges were forfeited.96 Under this approach, Davis could be held personally
liable for the debt.97 The court rejected this argument, noting that "statutes
making directors and officers liable for corporate debts must be strictly con-
strued and cannot be extended beyond the clear meaning of their
language." 98
The current jeopardy determination provision of the Tax Code became
effective on July 21, 1987; in Davis, the State sought to apply the statute to
taxes due prior to its effective date.99 The court pointed out that laws may
not operate retroactively to deprive or impair vested substantive rights under
existing laws,100 and held that a jeopardy determination may not be retroac-
tively applied to establish a franchise tax due date causing director or officer
liability to arise when it did not otherwise exist.101 Based on the failure of
the State's jeopardy argument and the ambiguity of the tax summary, that
portion of the trial court judgment holding Davis personally liable was re-
versed and remanded.1 0 2
3. The Texas Business Judgment Rule in Federal Court
Most of the recent decisions dealing with directors' fiduciary duties and
the business judgment rule are part of the "long line of many 'second-tier'
asset recovery cases brought by the FDIC in its efforts to resolve the nation-
wide banking crisis."' 1 3 Such actions usually involve tort claims by the
FDIC alleging malfeasance by directors, officers, employees, and profes-
sional service providers, such as lawyers and accountants.'0 4 In one such
case, the Fifth Circuit reviewed jury instructions on the fiduciary duty owed
by directors and officers of a financial institution and the availability of the
business judgment rule as a defense to claims of breach of duty. 0 5 The
95. Id. at 569.
96. Id. Section 111.022 of the Tax Code provides that if the comptroller believes that
collection of a tax required to be paid to the state is jeopardized by delay, the comptroller must
issue a determination stating the amount of the tax and that collection is in jeopardy. See TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 111.022 (West 1992). The amount determined is due and payable immedi-
ately. Id.
97. 846 S.W.2d at 569.
98. Id. at 570.
99. Id. at 569.
100. Id. at 570.
101. Id. at 571.
102. Id. at 572.
103. FDIC v. Niblo, 821 F. Supp. 441, 449 (N.D. Tex. 1993). "First tier" recovery usually
involves actions against the makers of notes and against collateral pledged, seeking satisfaction
of the original debt. Id. n.1 3.
104. Id.
105. FDIC v. Wheat, 970 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1992).
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court considered whether the instructions10 6 accurately stated the law and
did not mislead the jury. 0 7 The court found that the instructions were "lu-
cid and accurate on the duty question, and ... [contained] the business
judgment rule and its effect on the FDIC's case."' 08
In FDIC v. Brown'0 9 the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas considered whether the business judgment rule protected
former directors of RepublicBank-Houston against the FDIC's allegations of
negligence, gross negligence, and the abdication of duty. After an extensive
review of the history of the business judgment rule in Texas," l0 the court
concluded that a director's gross negligence is exempt from the protection of
the rule.'"' Further, the court concluded that the rule does not protect a
director if he abdicated his responsibility and failed to exercise any judg-
ment,11 2 noting that the rule necessarily presumes that directors have exer-
cised their judgment.' '3 In dicta, the court stated that although the
nineteenth-century origin of the rule may make it "appear anachronistic or
at least counter-intuitive to some notions of director liability ... [it] remains
a viable part of Texas jurisprudence and has been applied in the context of a
modern publicly held corporation." ' 14 Continuing, the court noted that the
business judgment rule
still furthers the public policy of encouraging citizens to serve as corpo-
rate directors by immunizing them from acts and omissions that in
hindsight proved to be wrong, as long as the directors were not person-
ally interested in the transaction or did not act fraudulently or contrary
to their lawful authority.' 15
106. The pertinent parts of the instructions were as follows:
Directors and officers of a bank owe a fiduciary duty to the bank, its share-
holders, depositors, and creditors. As fiduciaries, directors and officers have a
duty to act with the highest degree of loyalty, trust, and allegiance toward the
bank, and with the utmost candor, unselfishness and good faith. Directors and
officers of a bank are held to a higher standard of fair-dealing than a person not
in a fiduciary position because they are responsible for other people's money.
A breach of fiduciary duty consists of any failure of a director or officer to
comply with such standards.
A director or officer of a bank shall not be held liable if his conduct falls
within the business judgment rule .... [A] director or officer of a bank shall not
be liable for claims against him if, in the discharge of his duties, he exercised
ordinary care and acted in good faith and honestly exercised his best business
judgment within the limits of the actual authority of his position with the bank.
A director or officer of a bank shall not be held liable for honest mistake of
judgment if he acted with due care, in good faith, and in furtherance of a ra-
tional business purpose.
Id. at 130-31 n.13.
107. Id. at 130.
108. Id.
109. 812 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
110. Id. at 723-24.
111. Id. at 725.
112. Id. at 726.
113. Id.




In FDIC v. Niblo116 the corporation moved to strike the business judg-
ment rule as an affirmative defense of the defendant directors. The court
held that the rule was an affirmative defense within the meaning of Rule
8(C), 1 17 that it precluded judicial interference with the business judgment of
directors absent a showing of fraud or an ultra vires act, and that it raised
issues of fact to be determined at trial.1 8 Thus, the rule was not stricken as
a defense. " 9
4. Appeal after Dissolution
The case of Vanscot Concrete Co. v. Bailey 120 presented the Supreme
Court of Texas with the question of whether a corporation which has ceased
to exist under law may appeal a trial court's judgment against it. 121 On July
2, 1986, Vanscot Concrete Company (VCC) merged into Tarmac Texas, Inc.
(TTI), and articles of merger were properly filed with the Secretary of State.
Three months later, Bailey was injured by concrete poured from a truck
bearing the name "Express Pennington," which had been an assumed name
of VCC. Bailey sued VCC for his personal injuries. At trial, VCC moved
for a summary judgment on the basis of its merger with TTI and the acquisi-
tion by TTI of the assumed name "Express Pennington." The motion was
denied, and the trial court found for Bailey. 122
In the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, VCC contended that it was not liable
for Bailey's injuries, as a matter of law, because it did not exist on the date of
injury.' 23 The court agreed and dismissed the appeal without addressing
VCC's points of error.124 VCC appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court
applied and affirmed the reasoning of Texas Trunk Co. v. Jackson,125 hold-
ing that corporations have the same right to have judgments revised on ap-
peal as do persons, and that even extinguished corporations are entitled to a
hearing before the appellate courts. 126 The Court held that VCC was enti-
tled to bring an appeal and have the merits of its case addressed, and re-
manded the case for further consideration. 127
5. Federal Class Actions
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a shareholder seeking to
bring a derivative action on behalf of a corporation must "fairly and ade-
116. 821 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c); see 821 F. Supp. at 458.
118. Id. at 458.
119. Id. Other federal opinions interpreting Texas corporation law include FDIC v.
Thompson & Knight, 816 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Tex. 1993); FDIC v. Nathan, 804 F. Supp. 888
(S.D. Tex. 1992).
120. 853 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. 1993).
121. Id. at 526.
122. Id.
123. See 843 S.W.2d 193, 194-95 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1992).
124. Id. at 195.
125. 85 Tex. 605, 22 S.W. 1030 (1893).
126. 853 S.W.2d at 526.
127. Id. at 527.
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quately represent the interests of the shareholders ... similarly situated in
enforcing the right of the corporation."' 128 In Smith v. Ayres 129 the Fifth
Circuit reviewed the district court's determination of whether Andrew
Smith, the holder of one of the 10,000,000 outstanding shares of Smith Pro-
tective Services (SPS), could maintain a shareholder derivative action against
Ayres, the general counsel of the corporation.
The Fifth Circuit characterized the case as "but another chapter in a pro-
tracted internecine feud among Coralie Smith (mother of Andrew, Clayton,
and Mark), Andrew Smith, Clayton Smith, and Mark Smith, principals or
former principals of [SPS].' t30 Andrew had acquired his one share of SPS,
an assignment of all claims which SPS had against Ayres, and the right to
sue Ayres as part of a settlement agreement with the corporation. Because
Andrew was restricted from voting his stock and was obligated to reconvey
the share to SPS if it became unnecessary for maintaining the derivative ac-
tion against Ayres, the court concluded that Andrew had been granted the
stock for the sole purpose of generating federal standing for his action
against Ayres. 131
The court noted that Andrew's stake in SPS was "infinitesimal" and that
he received no cooperation from his brothers, the two remaining sharehold-
ers of SPS, in the litigation. 132 In fact, Mark and Clayton denied the essen-
tial allegations that formed the basis of the suit. In reviewing the facts, the
court pointed out that Andrew "has an unmistakable personal and profes-
sional dispute with Ayres,"1 33 that Andrew's brief was "peppered with vitu-
perative epithets, pugilistic metaphors, and descriptions of Ayres as 'satanic'
and 'evil',"' 134 and that the "catalog of the various lawsuits between these
two parties and their affiliates would consume well over a full page."' 35
Andrew argued that the test of adequate representation was not whether
he would adequately represent all shareholders, but rather those similarly
situated to himself. Because Mark and Clayton were not similarly situated,
Andrew claimed that he was in a class of one. The court pointed out that
only in the rarest circumstances may a shareholder derivative action proceed
with a class of one, and distinguished the present case from one in which
such circumstances were manifest. 136
In determining that the district court did not abuse its discretion in con-
cluding that Andrew was not an adequate representative,1 37 the Fifth Circuit
found that the district court properly considered the degree of support the
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
129. 977 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1992).
130. Id. at 947.
131. Id. at 948.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 949.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 948 (discussing Larson v. Dumke, 900 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1990), in which the
original owner of a franchise operation, who had retained a 25% interest in the corporation
and opposed an action by the new owners, was allowed to proceed with a derivative action).
137. 977 F.2d at 949.
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would-be plaintiff would receive from other shareholders, 38 the amount of
plaintiff's stake in the corporation as balanced against his interest and how
the litigation might affect his personal interests,13 9 and the degree of plain-
tiff's vindictiveness toward the defendant. 40 The court noted that a share-
holder plaintiff owes the corporation undivided loyalty, must not have
ulterior motives, must not be pursuing an external personal agenda, and
should not be allowed to proceed with a derivative action which could be
used as "leverage" in other litigation.' 4' Next, the court addressed An-
drew's claim of standing based on the express assignment of SPS's right to
sue Ayres. In what the court considered to be a novel claim, Andrew argued
that the generally accepted rule of non-assignability of Rule lOb-5 claims
was not applicable to his case because he received an express assignment and
did not rely on an automatic assignment which "travel[ed] with his single
share of stock."' 42 Ayres responded that to accept Andrew's approach and
allow such an assignment to create standing would "presage the develop-
ment of a futures market in Rule lOb-5 claims."' 43
In evaluating Andrew's claim, the court relied heavily on the holding of
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores'44 that Rule lOb-5 actions are re-
stricted to persons who are either purchasers or sellers of securities.' 45 The
court noted that the Blue Chip Stamps decision was intended to tightly re-
strict the availability of Rule lOb-5 actions,1 46 and was based on two policy
considerations which guided the decision in the instant case. The first con-
sideration was the Congressional intent behind the enactment of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which has been interpreted as
an effort to eliminate blackmail, nuisance, and strike suits.' 47 The second
consideration was the evidentiary problems inherent in allowing a non-pur-
chaser or non-seller to bring a Rule lOb-5 action.' 48
The district court had been particularly concerned that the "derivative
action will be used as a weapon in Andrew's arsenal rather than a device for
the protection of all shareholders," 149 and that "Andrew's personal antago-
nisms are a major motivation behind this lawsuit."' 150 The Fifth Circuit
found that the suit bore "all the hallmarks of a strike or nuisance suit, the
very actions which the Blue Chip Stamps decision [sought] to reduce or elim-
138. Id. at 948.
139. Id. at 949.
140. Id.
141. Id. The court quoted a passage in which Andrew said that he was committed to
'ruin[ing] ten years of [Ayres' life] . . . and if [Ayres] thinks this is even the end of the tenth
round, I mean we're-we're not even in the first round." Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).








inate," 15' and held that the district court did not err in dismissing the
claim. ' 52
B. LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL HIGHLIGHTS
1. Shareholder Liability for Contractual Obligations
The Seventy-Third Legislature addressed one of the most uncertain areas
of Texas corporation law by again trying to clarify the circumstances under
which a shareholder may be held liable for a corporation's contractual obli-
gations. This area has been of great concern to practitioners since the Texas
Supreme Court decision in Castleberry v. Branscum, 153 which resulted in
aggressive actions by claimants seeking to reach shareholder assets in satis-
faction of corporate debts.
In 1989, the legislature addressed the Castleberry decision by limiting the
circumstances under which shareholders could be held liable for corporate
obligations.' 54 As reflected in the 1993 Survey article' 55 and in the text
above, courts continued to have difficulty with corporate disregard issues as
the creativity and persuasiveness of the bar led to inconsistent judicial
conclusions. 156
Accordingly, the legislature attempted to further clarify the limited cir-
cumstances under which a shareholder will be liable for the contractual obli-
gation of a corporation. 5 7 As revised, Section A of Article 2.21 provides
that a holder of shares, an owner of any beneficial interest in shares, or a
subscriber
shall be under no obligation to the corporation or to its obligees with
respect to... any contractual obligation of the corporation on the basis
that the holder, owner, or subscriber is or was the alter ego of the corpora-
tion, or on the basis of actual fraud or constructive fraud, a sham to
perpetrate a fraud, or other similar theory, unless the obligee demon-
strates that the holder, owner, or subscriber caused the corporation to
be used for the purpose of perpetrating and did perpetrate an actual
fraud on the obligee primarily for the direct personal benefit of the
holder, owner, or subscriber .... 158
Section B now states that the "liability of a holder, owner, or subscriber of
shares ... for an obligation that is limited by Section A ... is exclusive and
preempts any other liability imposed on a holder, owner, or subscriber.., for
that obligation under common law or otherwise,"'159 unless that person has
151. Id.
152. Id. at 951.
153. 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
154. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21, § A (Vernon Supp. 1993).
155. See Robert F. Gray, Jr. et al., Corporations, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 46 SMU L.
REV. 1171, 1171-79 (1993).
156. See text accompanying notes 5-47.
157. HOUSE COMM. ON BUS. AND INDUSTRY, BILL ANALYSIS, § 2.05, Tex. H.B. 1239,
73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
158. TBCA Amendments, supra note 3, § 2.05 (amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.21, § A(2)) (emphasis added).
159. Id. (amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21, § B) (emphasis added).
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agreed to be liable for the obligation or is otherwise liable under the TBCA
or other applicable statute.160
One commentator has written that the 1989 amendments to TBCA Arti-
cle 2.21, made in response to Castleberry, resulted in the lower courts
"show[ing] an inclination to avoid the clear language and intent of the stat-
ute and allow contract claims against shareholders in the absence of actual
fraud."' 161 The 1993 amendment to Article 2.21 was an effort to "reverse
this trend by making it unambiguously clear that contractual claims against
a corporation may only be pursued against shareholders in the circum-
stances stated."' 162
Although such clarity was intended, the result may have fallen short.
Rather than to simply state that the circumstances set forth in Section A
provide the exclusive bases for pursuing contractual claims against share-
holders, Section B states that "[t]he liability of a [shareholder] . . .for an
obligation that is limited by Section A . . is exclusive and preempts any other
liability .... ,,163 A literal interpretation gives the conclusion that a share-
holder's liability precludes any other liability, begging the question of how a
shareholder who is not liable for an obligation under Section A can be pro-
tected against other theories of liability by Section B. 164 Even though the
statutory language of Section A has been tightened, it still may be possible
for courts which seek to find a shareholder personally liable to construe the
language of Section B in a manner which achieves the desired result.
Likewise, encouraging judicial interpretation of the phrase "or other simi-
lar theory" 165 may test the creativity of practitioners seeking to circumvent
the obvious intention of the legislature. The amendment does not address
non-contractual corporate obligations, however, and thus leaves the corpo-
rate disregard doctrines viable for use by tort claimants and those seeking
recovery based on other equitable theories.
2. Right of Directors to Examine Corporate Records
The TBCA amendments confirm that a director is entitled to examine the
160. Id.
161. Michael W. Tankersley, Amendments to the Texas Non-Profit Corporation Act and
Texas Business Corporation Act 28 (Aug. 20, 1993) (presented at the University of Texas
School of Law Business Legislation Update, Dallas, Texas; copy on file with the SMU Law
Review Association).
162. Id.
163. TBCA Amendments, supra note 3, § 2.05 (amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.21, § B) (emphasis added).
164. For example, suppose a defendant is sued for a corporate obligation under the alter
ego theory but plaintiff cannot prove an element required for recovery under TBCA Article
2.21 § A. Suppose further, however, that the plaintiff is successful in convincing the court that
the "denuding" theory (wherein a stockholder deprives the corporation of assets for personal
gain) is not "similar" to the alter ego theory for purposes of that statutory section. In such a
situation, Section B may not exclude liability under the denuding theory because the obligation
is not one for which the shareholder was liable under Section A. Although such a holding
seems unlikely, this example illustrates a gap between the legislature's apparent intent and the
resulting language.




corporation's books and accounting records, share transfer records, and cor-
porate minutes for any purpose reasonably related to his service as a direc-
tor.166 A statutory cause of action is provided whereby a court may compel
the corporation to open its books and records for inspection by the director
upon a showing that he is a director, he demanded to inspect the corporate
books and records, his purpose for inspecting the books and records was
reasonably related to his service as a director, and his right of access was
denied by the corporation. 167 The court can award attorneys' fees and any
other relief deemed to be just and proper. 168
The House Committee Report states that TBCA Article 2.44, as
amended, "[c]larifies that a director of a corporation has the right of access
to the corporation's books and records for any purpose reasonably related to
his service as a director."' 169 Prior to amendment, however, Article 2.44
addressed only the rights of shareholders, not the rights of directors. 170 One
reported decision addressed the issue of directors' rights to corporate infor-
mation, with the conclusion that because the TBCA charged directors with
responsibility for managing the affairs of the corporation, the right of a di-
rector to inspect corporate information was absolute. 17 1 Although no gui-
dance is offered as to whether the amendment was thought to clarify an
implied statutory right or to codify a common-law principle, the result is a
clearly beneficial change.
3. Reorganization Under Federal Law
With respect to a corporation being reorganized pursuant to a federal stat-
ute, the TBCA now authorizes the trustee, the designated officers of the cor-
poration, or any other individual appointed by the court to make certain
fundamental changes to the corporation without approval by either the
board of directors or the shareholders. 172 The changes authorized under
revised Article 4.14 include amending the articles of incorporation or by-
laws, merging or engaging in a share exchange, selling or disposing of sub-
stantially all of the assets, fixing the terms of bonds and debentures,
classifying the board of directors, removing or appointing new directors,
changing the registered office or registered agent of the corporation, and dis-
solution. 173 These amendments were intended to resolve "possible problems
presented in the consummation of a plan of reorganization under federal
bankruptcy law in connection with possible mergers, sales of assets, or disso-




169. HOUSE COMM. ON BUS. AND INDUSTRY, BILL ANALYSIS, § 2.11, Tex. H.B. 1239,
73d Leg., R.S. (1993) (emphasis added).
170. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44, § B (Vernon Supp. 1993).
171. Chavco Investment Co. v. Pybus, 613 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).





lution,"' 174 and should reduce the time necessary for Texas corporations to
emerge from bankruptcy proceedings.
4. Investment Companies
The TBCA has been amended to include references to corporations li-
censed under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Compa-
nies),175 The board of an open-end Investment Company may establish
classes and series of unissued shares by determining the relative rights of
such shares to the same extent that such authority is set forth in the com-
pany's articles of incorporation. The board may also increase or decrease
the number of shares which the corporation has the authority to issue, unless
a contrary provisions appears in the articles of incorporation.1 76
Article 2.21 of the TBCA has been amended by the addition of Section D,
providing that if the articles of incorporation or bylaws of an Investment
Company so provide, the corporation is not required to hold an annual
meeting of shareholders or to elect directors if not required to do so by the
Investment Company Act. 177 Directors of an Investment Company may,
unless removed in accordance with the articles of incorporation or bylaws of
the corporation, hold office for the term elected or until a successor is elected
and qualified. 178
5. Benefits for Directors
Article 2.02 of the TBCA, dealing with general corporate powers, has
been amended to clarify that a corporation may pay pensions and establish
pension plans pension trusts, profit sharing plans, stock bonus plans, or
other incentive plans for its directors as well as for its officers and
employees. '7 9
6. Interest on Dissenter's Shares
As amended, Article 5.12 of the TBCA provides that interest on shares
which have been valued in a judicial appraisal proceeding will begin to ac-
crue on the 91st day after the corporate action from which the shareholder
elected to dissent.' 80
7. Merger Approval
Article 5.03, dealing with the approval requirements for mergers, has been
amended to clarify that the only action which is required to effect a merger
174. HOUSE COMM. ON BUS. AND INDUSTRY, BILL ANALYSIS, § 2.12, Tex. H.B. 1239,
73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
175. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-I - 64 (1981); see TBCA Amendments, supra note 3, § 2.01 (amend-
ing TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 1.02(1 1)).
176. TBCA Amendments, supra note 3, § 2.04 (amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.12, § C).
177. Id. § 2.06 (adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.24, § D).
178. Id. § 2.08 (adding TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.32, § B).
179. Id. § 2.02 (amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02, § A(17)).
180. Id. § 2.16 (amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.12, § D).
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permitted without shareholder approval under Article 5.03(G) is the adop-
tion of a resolution of the board approving the plan of merger.' 8'
8. Amendment to Texas Constitution
In 1991, Article 2.16 of the TBCA was amended to add the following
language:
Subject to any provision of the Constitution of the State of Texas to the
contrary, the board of directors may authorize shares to be issued for
consideration consisting of any tangible or intangible benefit to the cor-
poration, including cash, promissory notes, services performed, con-
tracts for services to be performed, or other securities of the
corporation. ' 8 2
The language of Article 2.16 which required that the "consideration paid for
the issuance of shares shall consist of money paid, labor done, or property
actually received" was deleted.18 3
This change had no effect, however, because the Texas Constitution lim-
ited the consideration for which shares could be issued. 184 A Constitutional
amendment was submitted to and approved by Texas voters on November 2,
1993.185 Therefore, the language of Article 2.16, as amended in 1991, now
has legal effect. TBCA Article 3.05 still provides, however, that a corpora-
tion must receive $1,000 of consideration, consisting of "money, labor done,
or property actually received," before any business may be conducted. 8 6
Thus, although shares may now be issued for any consideration of tangible
or intangible benefit, such consideration may not be adequate to meet the
requirements of Article 3.05.
III. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
The national trend toward acceptance of the limited liability company
(LLC) as a viable business entity has picked up great speed since the Texas
Legislature enacted the Texas Limited Liability Company Act 8 7 (TLLCA)
on May 25, 1991. Twenty-nine states have adopted LLC statutes since that
time, bringing the total number of such states to thirty-seven as of November
4, 1993.188
181. See HOUSE COMM. ON BUS. AND INDUSTRY, BILL ANALYSIS, § 2.13, Tex. H.B.
1239, 73d Leg., R.S. (1993); TBCA Amendments, supra note 3, § 2.13 (amending TEX. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.03).
182. Act of May 20, 1991, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 901, § 4, 1991 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 3164
(amending TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.16).
183. See id.
184. See TEX. CONST. art. XIII, § 6.
185. See Tex. H.R.J. Res. 57, 73d Leg. R.S. (1993).
186. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 3.05 (Vernon 1980).
187. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n (Vernon Supp. 1993).
188. States with limited liability company statutes include Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,




Although no cases were reported during the survey period construing the
provisions of the TLLCA, the legislature made a number of amendments
which clarify and enhance the usefulness of the statute.189 The most signifi-
cant changes are discussed in Part A below. Part B provides an overview of
recent federal income tax developments which may be of interest to practi-
tioners involved in the formation and operation of LLCs. Finally, because
the four states surrounding Texas have all enacted LLC statutes in recent
months, Part C provides a summary of the statutory registration require-
ments affecting Texas LLCs which do business in those surrounding states.
A. LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS TO THE TLLCA
1. One-Member LLCs
Prior to amendment, the TLLCA was not clear as to whether a Texas
LLC could be formed with only one member. Practitioners and commenta-
tors had generally concluded that one-member LLCs were permitted under
the statute' 90 because it provided that (i) only one organizer was needed to
form the company' 91 and (ii) an LLC could avoid dissolution if at least one
remaining member continued the business of the company after the termina-
tion of another member's membership. 92 Support was inferred for this
proposition from the fact that the TLLCA, based on the Colorado LLC Act
explicitly requiring two members for formation, was silent as to the number
of members required for formation. 193 The legislature ended the uncertainty
on this issue by amending Article 4.01 to clarify that an LLC "may have one
or more members."' 194
2. LLC Name
Article 2.03 of the TLLCA required each LLC name to include either
"Limited," "Ltd.," or "L.C." in order to denote the limited liability nature
of the entity.195 The amendments add the option of using the words "Lim-
ited Liability Company" or "Limited Company," as well as the abbrevia-
tions "L.L.C.," "LLC," "LC," and "LTD."' 196 LLCs formed before
September 1, 1993 which complied with the TLLCA on the date of forma-
tion are not required to change their names in order to conform to the
189. See Act of May 7, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 215, §§ 1.01-1.28, 1993 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 420 (Vernon) (amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n) [hereinafter TLLCA
Amendments].
190. See Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerg-
ing Entity, 47 Bus. LAW. 375, 410 n.237 (1992) [hereinafter Keatinge]; Matthew W. Ray,
Comment. The Texas Limited Liability Company-A Possible Alternative for Business Forma-
tion, 46 SMU L. REV. 841, 843 (1992) [hereinafter Ray].
191. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 3.01, § A (Vernon Supp. 1993).
192. Id. Art. 6.01, § A(4).
193. See Ray, supra note 190, at 844 n.21.
194. TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.15 (amending TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 1528n, Art. 4.01, § A).
195. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.03, § A(l).
196. TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.02 (amending TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 1528n, Art. 2.03, § A(I)).
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amended statute. 197 No certificate of authority will be issued to a foreign
LLC unless its name complies with the requirements set forth above, 198 but
foreign LLCs which complied with the TLLCA and procured a certificate of
authority prior to September 1, 1993 will not be required to change their
names in order to conform to the TLLCA as amended. 199
3. Period of Duration
Article 3.02 of the TLLCA, which originally restricted the period of dura-
tion of an LLC to 30 years, has been amended to allow the articles of organi-
zation of an LLC to provide for perpetual duration. 2°° Before providing for
perpetual duration, however, practitioners should consider the effect such a
choice will have on the entity's classification for federal income tax
purposes.20 1
4. Allocations of Profit and Loss
The TLLCA, prior to amendment, did not specify how the profits and
losses of an LLC should be allocated among its members. Newly enacted
Article 5.02-1 directs that profits and losses are to be allocated in the manner
set forth in the LLC's regulations, if any method is provided. 20 2 In the ab-
sence of such a provision, profits and losses should be allocated among the
members in accordance with their then-current percentage interests in the
company, as specified in the accounting records of the company.20 3 This
amendment was intended to conform the TLLCA to Section 5.03 of the
Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act, 2°' and strengthens the LLC's re-
semblance to the partnership form for tax purposes.
5. Management
Unless an LLC's management powers were reserved to its members in the
regulations, the TLLCA dictated that such powers would be exercised under
the authority of the entity's managers. 20 5 Despite this default provision, the
TLLCA required each LLC to include a statement in its articles of organiza-
tion that the company was to be managed by a manager or managers (along
with the names and addresses of such managers) or, if management was re-
served to the members, the names and addresses of such members. 20 6
The amendments clarify that if the management of an LLC is fully re-
197. Id.
198. Id. § 1.24 (amending TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 7.03, § A(1)).
199. Id.
200. Id. § 1.12 (amending TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 3.02, § A(2)).
201. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b). See also infra text accompanying notes 290-310.
202. TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.18 (adding Art. 5.02-1 to TEX. REV. CIV.
STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
203. Id.
204. HOUSE COMM. ON BUS. AND INDUSTRY, BILL ANALYSIS, § 1.18, Tex. H.B. 1239,
73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
205. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.12, § A (Vernon Supp. 1993).
206. Id. Art. 3.02, § A(5).
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served to its members, the LLC need not have managers at all. 20 7 Each
LLC's articles of organization must now affirmatively state whether the LLC
will or will not have managers. 20 8 The power to manage the company can
be reserved to its members either in the regulations or the articles of organi-
zation, and the powers, rights, and duties of any manager (or group of man-
agers) can be enlarged or restricted by the articles or the regulations. 20 9
Further, if management of the company is reserved in whole or in part to its
members, the provisions of the TLLCA dealing with interested manager
transactions, 210 management committees, 21" management meetings, 212 and
indemnification 21 3 apply to the members to the same extent as those provi-
sions would otherwise apply to the managers. 214
The initial managers of an LLC previously held office until the first annual
meeting of members and until their successors were elected and qualified. 215
Managers were thereafter elected at each annual meeting,216 unless the
LLC's regulations provided for the managers to be divided into two or three
classes with one- to three-year staggered terms.217 Each manager may now
be elected for a specified term or until that manager's death, resignation, or
removal. 218 Managers may be divided into any number of classes to serve
for any term specified in the regulations. 219 The regulations may also allow
for any particular group of members to elect one or more managers who
shall hold office for such term as specified in the regulations or until
removal. 220
The amendments restricted the authority of committees of managers by
providing that unless the articles of organization, regulations, or resolution
designating the particular committee expressly so provides, no committee of
managers may authorize or make a distribution of LLC cash or property to
the members or authorize the issuance of interests in the company.22'
6 Officers and Agents
The TLLCA previously provided that the managers of an LLC could des-
ignate one or more persons as non-manager officers of the company. 222
207. TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.06 (amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 1528n, Art. 2.12, § A).
208. Id. § 1.12 (amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 3.02, § A(5)).
209. Id.
210. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.17, (Vernon Supp. 1993).
211. Id. Art. 2.18.
212. Id. Art. 2.19.
213. Id. Art. 2.20.
214. TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.06 (amending TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 1528n, Art. 2.12, § A).
215. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.13, § A (Vernon Supp. 1993).
216. Id.
217. See id. Art. 2.14, § A.
218. TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.07 (amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 1528n, Art. 2.13, § A).
219. Id. § 1.08 (amending TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.14, § A).
220. Id. § 1.07 (amending TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.13, § A).
221. Id. § 1.09 (amending TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.18, § A).
222. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.21, § A (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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Each manager and officer was deemed to be an agent of the company for the
purposes of carrying on company business and binding the company, unless
the manager or officer lacked authority to act for the company and the per-
son with whom the manager or officer was dealing had knowledge of that
fact.223
As amended, the TLLCA provides that the group in which management
power is vested (either managers or members) may designate one or more
persons, whether or not such persons are managers or members, as officers
of the company. 224 The amendments have clarified the agency authority of
each member, manager, and officer by specifying that, for the purposes of
conducting company business, authorized agents shall consist of (a) officers
or other agents to the extent of their actual or apparent authority, (b) each
manager, to the extent that management of the LLC is vested in that man-
ager, and (c) each member, to the extent that management of the company is
reserved to that member.225 Each officer, agent, manager, and member of
the LLC, as among themselves and the company, has the authority and may
perform the duties provided for in the regulations or as determined by reso-
lution of the group in which management power is vested. 226 An act by any
officer, agent, manager, or member of the company binds the company un-
less such person lacks the authority to act for the company and the person
with whom the officer, agent, manager, or member is dealing has knowledge
of such lack of authority. 227
7. Voting
With regard to voting and quorum requirements applicable to LLC mem-
bers, the TLLCA deferred to the regulations of the company228 and, as a
default, relied upon the provisions of the Texas Business Corporation Act. 229
The amendments add new Article 2.23, which provides that "a majority of
the members, managers, or members of any committee constitutes a quorum
for the transaction of business at any meeting" of such group, unless other-
wise provided in the TLLCA or the articles of organization or regulations of
the company. 230 The act of a majority of the members entitled to vote, man-
223. Id.
224. TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.10 (amending TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 1528n, Art. 2.21, § A).
225. Id. § 1.10 (adding Art. 2.21, § C to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n); see also
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.10, § A (original provision of the TLLCA
regarding the authority to contract debts and obligations on behalf of the entity).
226. TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.10 (adding § B to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.21).
227. Id. § 1.10 (adding § D to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.21).
228. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 4.02 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
229. Article 8.12 provides, in part, as follows:
To the extent this Act contains no provision with respect to one of the matters
provided for in the TBCA or the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws Act
... the provisions of the TBCA and the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws
Act shall supplement the provisions of this Act to the extent they are not incon-
sistent with the provisions of this Act.
230. TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.11 (adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 1528n, Art. 2.23, § A).
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agers, or committee members present at a meeting at which a quorum is
present constitutes the act of the members, managers, or the committee. 23'
The term "majority" means "more than one-half, by number, of all the
members, managers, or committee members, as the case may be."' 232
The TLLCA now provides that, unless otherwise specified in the articles
of organization or regulations of the company, "the affirmative vote, ap-
proval, or consent of a majority of all members [not merely those present at
a meeting at which a quorum is present] is required to amend the articles of
organization or regulations," 233 change the company from a member-man-
aged LLC to a manager-managed LLC or vice versa,234 issue additional
membership interests, 235 approve any merger, consolidation, share exchange
or interest exchange, 236 voluntarily cause the dissolution of the company, 237
authorize any transaction which is unrelated to the purpose of the company
or contrary to its regulations, 238 or authorize any act which would make it
impossible for the company to carry on its ordinary business. 239
Article 2.23 has particular significance for LLC members in that it vests
equal voting power in each member, regardless of their respective interests in
the company. Under this one-member, one-vote concept, control of a three-
member LLC (of which one member owns 80% and the other two each own
10%) can rest with two members owning only a minimal interest in the
company. Persons expecting to own a majority interest in a newly-formed
LLC should be advised to take advantage of their statutory right to provide
for interest-based voting in the LLC's articles of organization or regulations.
Majority-interest owners of existing LLCs with articles or regulations which
do not provide for proportional-interest voting should consider amending
the governance documents at their earliest convenience.
Other changes brought about by new Article 2.23 include an express au-
thorization for members, managers, and committees to take action without a
meeting, if a written consent form is signed by the number of persons as
would have been required to consent at a meeting called for such purpose, 24°
and to conduct meetings by conference telephone or similar communications
equipment. 24 1
8. Merger
Prior to the 1993 amendments, the TLLCA did not explicitly address
231. Id.
232. Id. § 1.11 (adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.23, § F).
233. Id. § 1.11 (adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.23, § D(1)) (empha-
sis added).
234. Id. § 1.11 (adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.23, § D(2)).
235. Id. § 1.11 (adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.23, § D(3)).
236. Id. § 1.11 (adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.23, § D(4)).
237. Id. § 1.11 (adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.23, § D(5)).
238. Id. § 1.11 (adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.23, § D(6)).
239. Id. § 1.11 (adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.23, § D(7)).
240. Id. § 1.11 (adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.23, § B).
241. Id. § 1.11 (adding TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.23, § C).
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whether an LLC could merge with another entity. It dealt with the merger
issue by providing that:
to the extent this Act contains no provision with respect to one of the
matters provided for in the TBCA or the Texas Miscellaneous Corpora-
tion Laws Act... the provisions of the TBCA and the Texas Miscella-
neous Corporation Laws Act shall supplement the provisions of this
Act to the extent they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act.... Article 5 of the TBCA [dealing with mergers] shall supplement
the provisions of this Act and a limited liability company shall be an
"other entity" as that term is defined in the TBCA . . .. 242
Based on the quoted language, it was clear that a Texas LLC could partici-
pate in, and be the surviving entity of, a merger with a domestic corpora-
tion.24 3 What was not clear was whether the LLC could merge with
anything other than a domestic corporation. 244 This question was answered
by the 1993 amendments, which provide that domestic LLCs may adopt a
plan of merger and merge with domestic or foreign LLCs or other enti-
ties. 245 These new merger provisions were modeled after section 2.11 of the
Texas Revised Limited Partnership Act and, with respect to new TLLCA
Article 10.05, Article 5.16 of the TBCA.246 The term "merger" is defined to
include:
(a) the division of a domestic [LLC] into two or more new domestic
[LLCs] or into a surviving [LLC] and one or more new domestic or
foreign [LLCs] or other entities, or (b) the combination of one or more
domestic [LLCs] with one or more foreign or domestic [LLCs] or other
entities .... 247
Before an LLC may merge with another entity, a written plan of merger
must be adopted by each constituent entity. 248 The plan of merger must be
approved by a majority of the respective members of each domestic LLCs,
unless the regulations or articles of organization of each LLC specifies other-
wise. 249 If a foreign LLC or other entity is a party to the merger, the merger
must be consistent with, in compliance with, and permitted by the laws of its
home state, its organizational documents, and the laws of the State of
Texas.250 No merger may cause any member of a participant LLC, without
such members' consent, to become personally liable for the debts or obliga-
tions of any other person as a result of the merger.25'
The plan of merger must include the name and state of domicile of each
242. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 8.12 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
243. See Keatinge, supra note 190, at 394 n.126; Ray, supra note 190, at 853.
244. Id.
245. TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.01, § A to TEX. REV.
CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
246. HOUSE COMM. ON BUS. AND INDUSTRY, BILL ANALYSIS, § 1.28, Tex. H.B. 1239,
73d Leg., R.S. (1993).
247. TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.01 (adding Art. 1.02, § A(10) to TEX. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
248. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.01, § A to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
249. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.01, § A(1)(a) to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
250. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.01, § A(1)(b) to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
251. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.01, § A(2) to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
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limited liability company or other entity which is involved in the merger, 25 2
the name of the entity which will survive the merger, 253 and the name and
state of domicile of each new entity which will be created pursuant to the
plan of merger. 25 4 The plan must include the terms and conditions of the
merger including, if more than one entity will survive, the manner and basis
of allocating and vesting all property, liabilities, and obligations of the con-
stituent entities. 2 5 The plan must specify the manner and basis of con-
verting the ownership interests or shares of the constituent entities into the
ownership interests, shares, or other obligations of the surviving entity or
entities. 256 The plan must also include the articles of organization and other
organizational documents of each new LLC or other entity to be created by
the merger. 25 7
After the plan of merger has been approved by each of the entities which
are a party thereto, articles of merger must be executed by each domestic
LLC258 and filed with the Secretary of State. 25 9 Such articles of merger
must include the plan of merger 26° and, for each entity which is a party
thereto, a statement that the plan was authorized by all action required by
the laws under which it was formed or organized or by its constituent docu-
ments.261 Unless a delayed effective date is specified, the merger is effective
on the issuance of a certificate of merger by the Secretary of State.262
When the merger takes effect, the separate existence of each non-surviving
entity ceases. 263 Additionally, the ownership interests or shares which are to
be converted into other interests, shares, or securities pursuant to the plan of
merger are so converted. 264 Further, all property rights, liabilities, and obli-
gations of the participant entities are allocated to and vested in the surviving
entity (or entities) as provided by the plan of merger without further ac-
tion.265 Any proceeding pending by or against an LLC that is a party to the
merger may be continued as if the merger had never occurred. 26 6
The amendments to the TLLCA permit the merger of parent and subsidi-
ary entities on the basis of at least 90% ownership by the parent of the out-
standing membership interests, shares of stock, or other ownership interests
in the subsidiary entity. 267 Further, one or more LLCs or other entities may
now adopt a plan of exchange whereby an acquiring entity acquires all the
252. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.02, § A(I) to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
253. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.02, § A(2) to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
254. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.02, § A(3) to TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
255. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.02, § A(4) to TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
256. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.02, § A(5) to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
257. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.02, § A(6), (7) to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
258. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.03, § A to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
259. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.03, § B to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
260. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.03, § A(1) to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
261. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.03, § A(2) to TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
262. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.03, § C to TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
263. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.04, § A(I) to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
264. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.04, § A(7) to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
265. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.04, § A(2), (3) to TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
266. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.04, § A(4) to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
267. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.05 to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
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outstanding interests of one or more LLCs, or all of the outstanding stock,
partnership interests, or other interests of another type of entity, in return
for the cash or securities of the acquiring entity.268
9. Dissolution and Winding Up
The amendments clarify the conditions upon which an LLC may avoid
dissolution after (a) the expiration of its period of duration, (b) the occur-
rence of an event causing dissolution, as specified in the articles of organiza-
tion or regulations, or (c) the expulsion, withdrawal, bankruptcy, or
dissolution of a member. 269 If one of these events occurs, the LLC will not
be dissolved so long as there is at least one remaining member and the busi-
ness of the company is "continued by the vote of the members or class as
stated in the articles of organization or regulations of the [LLC], or if not so
stated, by all remaining members. ' 270 An election to continue the business
of the company must be made within 90 days after the occurrence of the
event of dissolution, unless otherwise provided in the articles or regula-
tions.271 If such an election is made, it is not effective unless the company
amends its articles during the three-year period following the event of disso-
lution to either extend its period of duration or delete the event specified in
the articles which caused the dissolution, as applicable. 272
The TLLCA has also been amended to allow the appointment of any per-
son designated by the LLC's articles of organization, regulations, or resolu-
tion of the members or managers to effect the winding-up of the company
after dissolution. 273 This expands the group of persons which may be desig-
nated to wind up the affairs of the company beyond the members and man-
agers, as previously required. 274
10. Professional LLCs
The Seventy-Third Legislature made the LLC form expressly available to
persons offering professional services through the addition of Part Eleven of
the TLLCA. 275 One or more persons may now organize a "professional lim-
ited liability company," for the purpose of offering one specific type of pro-
fessional service, by filing articles of organization with the Secretary of State
in accordance with Part Three of the TLLCA.276 The company name must
include the words "Professional Limited Liability Company" or the abbrevi-
ations "P.L.L.C." or "PLLC. '277 A "professional service" is defined as any
type of personal service that requires the obtaining of a license, permit, cer-
268. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 10.06, § A to TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
269. See id. § 1.20.
270. Id. § 1.20 (adding TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 6.01, § B).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. § 1.21 (amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 6.03, § A).
274. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 6.03, § A (Vernon Supp. 1993).
275. See TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.28 (adding Arts. 11.01-.07 to TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
276. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 11.01, § A to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
277. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 11.02, § A to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
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tificate of registration, or other legal authorization as a condition precedent
to the rendering of the service. 27 8 According to the statute, persons offering
professional services include architects, attorneys, public accountants and
certified public accountants, dentists, doctors, physicians, surgeons, and
veterinarians. 279
Only persons who are licensed or otherwise authorized to perform the
professional service of the PLLC may become members, managers, or of-
ficers of the company. 280 If a member, manager, or officer becomes legally
disqualified to render the professional services of the company, such person
must sever all employment and immediately terminate all financial interest
in the company. 28 1 The company is obligated by statute to purchase the
membership interest owned by a disqualified member on terms specified in
the company's articles of organization, regulations, or other agreements. 282
If the company has only one member, the disqualified professional may con-
tinue to act as a member, manager, or officer only for the purposes of the
winding-up and dissolution of the company.283
Part Eleven expressly states that it does not alter or affect the relationship
between any person rendering professional services and any person receiving
such services.284 The existence of a PLLC does not diminish any legal rights
which a person may have against the professional for errors, omissions, neg-
ligence, incompetence, or malfeasance. 28 5 Under the statute, the company
and the specific members, managers, officers, employees, or other agents ren-
dering the professional service in the course of their employment are held
jointly and severally liable for any liability resulting therefrom. 28 6 The
members, managers, officers, employees, or agents of the company which did
not render the services in question are expressly exempted from personal
liability by the statute. 287
The sale, issuance, or offering of membership interests in a PLLC is ex-
pressly exempt from all state laws providing for the supervision, regulation,
or registration of securities.28 8 The sale, issuance, or offering of PLLC inter-
ests to persons permitted to own such interests is deemed to be legal without
any action or approval by any state regulatory agency authorized to regu-
late, license, or supervise the sale, issuance, or offering of securities. 289
B. FEDERAL INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS
The Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) issued a number of Revenue Proce-
278. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 11.01, § B(1) to TEX. REv. Clv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
279. Id.
280. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 11.03, § A to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
281. Id. § 1.28 (adding Art. 11.03, § B to TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n).
282. Id.
283. Id.








dures and Revenue Rulings during 1992 and 1993 which clarified and inter-
preted the tax classification of LLCs under Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-
2. In addition, a private letter ruling was issued which dealt with the appro-
priate accounting method for a professional firm operating as an LLC.
These are addressed below.
1. Revenue Procedures
Rev. Proc. 92-33290 offered definitive guidance on the issue of whether a
partnership has the corporate characteristic of "free transferability of inter-
ests" 29 1 by indicating that the I.R.S. will rule that a partnership lacks that
characteristic "if, throughout the life of the partnership, the partnership
agreement expressly restricts ... the transferability of partnership interests
representing more than 20% of all interests in partnership capital, income,
gain, loss, deduction, and credit. '292 Rev. Proc. 92-35293 expanded the
range of instances in which the I.R.S. will rule that an organization lacks the
corporate characteristic of "continuity of life."' 294 Rev. Proc. 89-12295 indi-
cates that the I.R.S. will not rule that a limited partnership lacks the charac-
teristic of continuity of life if, in the case of a removal of the general partner,
the partnership agreement permits less than a majority in interest of the lim-
ited partners to continue the partnership. Rev. Proc. 92-35 supplements
Rev. Proc. 89-12 by stating that the I.R.S. will not rule that a limited part-
nership possesses continuity of life if, under the partnership agreement, the
bankruptcy or removal of a general partner will cause a dissolution of the
partnership "unless the remaining general partners or at least a majority in
interest of all remaining partners agree to continue the partnership. ' 296
Rev. Procs. 92-87297 and 92-88298 provided clarification regarding when,
for purposes of rulings and determination letters, limited partnerships (or-
290. 1992-1 C.B. 782.
291. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1). The regulations provide that:
[a]n organization has the corporate characteristic of free transferability of inter-
ests if each of its members or those members owning substantially all of the
interests in the organization have the power, without the consent of other mem-
bers, to substitute for themselves . . . a person who is not a member of the
organization. In order for this power of substitution to exist . . . the member
must be able, without the consent of other members, to confer upon his substi-
tute all the attributes of his interest in the organization.
Id.
292. Rev. Proc. 92-33, 1992-1 C.B. 782.
293. 1992-1 C.B. 790.
294. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1). The regulations provide that:
[a]n organization has continuity of life if the death, insanity, bankruptcy, retire-
ment, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause a dissolution of the
organization.... If the retirement, death, or insanity of a general partner of a
limited partnership causes a dissolution of the partnership, unless the remaining
general partners . . . or unless all remaining members agree to continue the
partnership, continuity of life does not exist.
Id.
295. 1989-1 C.B. 798.
296. Rev. Proc. 92-35, 1992-1 C.B. 790 (emphasis added).
297. 1992-42 I.R.B. 38.
298. 1992-42 I.R.B. 39.
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ganized under a state limited partnership act corresponding to the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act) will be treated as lacking the corporate character-
istics of continuity of life and limited liability299 and thus will not ordinarily
need to request an entity classification ruling.
2. Revenue Rulings
The most surprising ruling to date dealing with the tax classification of an
LLC, Rev. Rul. 93-6300, centered on the existence of the corporate charac-
teristic of centralized management. In Rev. Rul. 93-6, the I.R.S. considered
the classification of a Colorado LLC and held that the entity would be taxed
as a partnership for federal income tax purposes.30 1 The regulations dealing
with centralized management provide that an organization has that charac-
teristic if any person (or group of persons that does not include all the mem-
bers) has continuing authority to make the decisions necessary to conduct
the business of the organization. 30 2 The LLC in question had five members
who were each elected as a manager of the company. 30 3 In spite of the fact
that management was centralized in a group which included all the mem-
bers, the I.R.S. ruled that the characteristic of centralized management ex-
isted because the authority to make management decisions rested with the
members in their capacity as managers, rather than as members. 3°4 This
ruling should serve as a warning to practitioners to take special care in draft-
ing LLC articles and regulations in order to avoid causing the entity to pos-
sess the characteristic of centralized management.
Rev. Rul. 93-38305 dealt with the classification of two LLCs organized
under the Delaware LLC statute. The first LLC considered in the ruling
was structured to avoid taxation as an association, and the I.R.S. so ruled. 30 6
The governance documents of the second LLC provided that (a) the com-
pany would be managed by managers, (b) the company would continue
under all circumstances, without the prior approval of any member or man-
ager, and (c) the company's interests could be assigned without consent from
any member or manager, and that the assignee would acquire all the attrib-
utes of the member's interest in the company. 30 7 The LLC was found to
possess all four corporate characteristics, and thus was classified as an asso-
ciation for federal income tax purposes. 30 8
Other rulings which may be of interest include Rev. Ruls. 93-30309 and
299. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b), (d).
300. 1993-3 I.R.B. 8.
301. Id.
302. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1).
303. See Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-3 I.R.B. 8.
304. Id. For a more thorough discussion of Rev. Rul. 93-6, as well as an exhaustive listing
of rulings and procedures affecting LLCs, see R. Brent Clifton, Update Of The Tax Classifica-
tion Of LLCs, STATE BAR OF TEXAS SECTION OF TAXATION NEWSLETTER, Feb. 1993, at 4.




309. 1993-16 I.R.B. 4.
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93-5,310 in which LLCs organized under the Nevada and Virginia statutes,
respectively, were classified as partnerships for federal tax purposes.
3. Tax Accounting Methods of PLLCs
The amendments to the TLLCA expressly authorized the formation of
PLLCs, through which doctors, lawyers, accountants, architects, and others
may practice their profession and reduce the risk of personal liability arising
from the torts of their colleagues.31' Professionals currently practicing in
general partnership form who wish to convert to a PLLC should, however,
carefully evaluate the federal income tax implications of such a conversion.
Commentators have recently noted that the Internal Revenue Code may dic-
tate a change from the cash method of accounting, commonly used by pro-
fessionals, to the accrual method of accounting upon a conversion from
general partnership form to PLLC. 312 This change could force the accelera-
tion of a substantial amount of taxable income into the year of conversion as
a result of the valuation of accounts receivable. 31 3 Depending upon the
amount and anticipated collection dates of the accounts receivable and the
liquidity of the PLLC members, such a recognition of income could have
potentially catastrophic consequences.
The I.R.S. has issued one private letter ruling which indicates that profes-
sionals may be able to retain the cash method of accounting after conversion
to a PLLC.3 14 The facts upon which the ruling was based are highly spe-
cific 3 15 and apply only to the firm under consideration, however, and a
number of significant questions on the issue of the appropriate tax account-
ing method still remain unanswered. 31 6
C. QUALIFICATION OF TEXAS LLCs IN THE ADJOINING STATES
All four states bordering Texas have recently enacted an LLC statute of
one form or another. Texas businesses which operate as LLCs and transact
business in one of the surrounding states should consider whether qualifying
in that state is appropriate. The following paragraphs summarize the qualifi-
310. 1993-3 I.R.B. 6.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 275-89.
312. Sheldon I. Banoff et al., Tax Trap For Professionals Forming LLCs, J. TAX'N, July
1993, at 63.
313. See id.
314. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-21-047 (Feb. 25, 1993) (Arizona law firm practicing as a general
partnership authorized to use cash method of accounting after conversion to a PLLC organ-
ized under the Arizona LLC statute).
315. Among other things, the law firm represented that all LLC members would continue
in the active practice of law and would participate in the management of the firm. Id.
316. See Sheldon I. Banoff, New IRS Ruling Encourages Professionals to Form Limited
Liability Companies, J. TAX'N, August 1993, at 68. Mr. Banoff raises a number of troubling
questions for practitioners in connection with the issuance of Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9321047. For
example, would the ruling have been issued if less than all the members of the law firm were
involved in all the major activities and decisions? Id. at 70. Would a favorable ruling be
precluded if the firm consisted of two or more tiers of partners with differing voting interests?
Id. Does the ruling imply that the cash method is not available in a situation where all the




cation requirements for Texas LLCs operating in Oklahoma, Arkansas, New
Mexico, and Louisiana.
1. Oklahoma
Before a Texas LLC may lawfully transact business in Oklahoma, it must
register with the office of the Oklahoma Secretary of State. 317 Under
Oklahoma statute, any Texas LLC which owns income-producing real or
tangible personal property in Oklahoma (which is not otherwise exempted
by statute) is considered to be transacting business in the state. 318 Registra-
tion involves the payment of a $300 fee319 and the filing of an original certifi-
cate from the office of the Texas Secretary of State attesting to the LLC's
organization under the laws of the State of Texas. 320 LLCs must also submit
two copies of an application for registration, signed by a manager, member,
or other person, stating the LLC's name, date and state of organization, reg-
istered agent for service of process in Oklahoma, and related information. 32'
An LLC may not register to transact business in Oklahoma if its name
does not satisfy the requirements of the Oklahoma Limited Liability Com-
pany Act.322 The Oklahoma statute requires that the name of each LLC
contain either the words "limited liability company" or the abbreviations
"L.L.C." or "L.C.1 323 This requirement is more restrictive than the Texas
statute which, as amended, also allows the use of "Limited Company,"
"Limited," "Ltd.," "LTD," "LLC," and "LC." 324 Thus, a Texas LLC us-
ing these additional words or abbreviations may be required to select a desig-
nated name which satisfies the requirements of Oklahoma law before a
certificate of registration will be granted. 325
A Texas LLC which has not registered in Oklahoma may not maintain an
action, suit, or proceeding in an Oklahoma court until the statutory registra-
tion requirements are met.326 By transacting business in Oklahoma without
registration, the Texas LLC appoints the Oklahoma Secretary of State as its
agent for service of process for actions arising out of transactions in the
state.327 The failure of the LLC to register does not affect the validity of any
act which it may have taken or contract to which it may have been a
party. 328 No member or manager of a Texas LLC becomes liable for the
debts and obligations of the entity solely because it transacted business in the
State of Oklahoma without first complying with the registration
317. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2043 (West Supp. 1993).
318. Id. § 2049(B).
319. Id. § 2055(9).
320. Id. § 2043(2).
321. Id. § 2043(3).
322. Id. § 2045.
323. Id. § 2008(1).
324. See TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.02 (amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.03, § A(1)).
325. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2045 (West Supp. 1993).
326. Id. § 2048(A).
327. Id. § 2048(c).





Before a Texas LLC may lawfully transact business in Arkansas, it must
register with the office of the Arkansas Secretary of State.330 Registration
involves the payment of a $300 fee331 and the filing of two copies of an appli-
cation for registration, signed by a person with authority to do so under
Texas law, stating the LLC's name, date and state of organization, registered
agent for service of process in Arkansas, and related information. 332 No
certificate of registration will be issued unless the name of the LLC satisfies
the requirements of Arkansas law.3 33 The Arkansas statute permits the use
of all the same words and abbreviations in an LLC name as are permitted by
the TLLCA, with the exception that "LTD" is not specifically authorized as
an abbreviation for the word "Limited." 334
A Texas LLC which has not registered in Arkansas may not maintain an
action, suit, or proceeding in an Arkansas court until it has registered in the
state.335 By transacting business in Arkansas without registration, the Texas
LLC appoints the Arkansas Secretary of State as its agent for service of
process for actions arising out of transactions in the state.336 The failure of
the LLC to register does not affect the validity of any act which it may have
taken or contract to which it may have been a party.337 No member or
manager of a Texas LLC becomes liable for the debts and obligations of the
entity solely because it transacted business in the State of Arkansas without
first complying with the registration requirements. 338
3. New Mexico
Before a Texas LLC may transact business in New Mexico, it is required
to register with the New Mexico State Corporation Commission. 339 Regis-
tration involves the submission of two copies of an application for registra-
tion, executed by a person with authority to do so under Texas law, stating
the LLC's name, date and state of organization, registered agent for service
in New Mexico, the identity of persons in whom the management of the
LLC is vested, and related information. 340
329. Id. § 2048(D).
330. Small Business Entity Tax Pass-Through Act, § 1002, 1993 Ark. Acts 1003 (1993) (to
be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-1002).
331. Id. § 1302(a)(xiii) (to be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-1301).
332. Id. § 1002(a)-(f) (to be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-1002).
333. Id. § 1004 (to be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-1004).
334. See id. § 103 (to be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-103); TLLCA Amendments,
supra note 189, § 1.02 (amending TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.03, § A(I)).
335. Small Business Entity Tax Pass-Through Act, § 1007(a), 1993 Ark. Acts 1003 (1993)
(to be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-1007).
336. Id. § 1007(c).
337. Id. § 1007(b).
338. Id. § 1007(g).
339. Limited Liability Company Act, Ch. 280, § 48, 1993 N.M. Laws 2753, 2807 (to be
codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-48).
340. Id. at 2807-08.
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The name of the Texas LLC must be one which would be permitted by the
New Mexico Limited Liability Company Act.341 The Act requires that each
LLC name include the words "limited liability company" or "limited com-
pany;" the words "limited" and "company" may be abbreviated as "ltd."
and "co.," respectively. 342 This requirement is more restrictive than the
Texas statute which, as amended, also allows the use of "Limited," "LTD,"
"L.L.C.," "LLC," and "LC. ' '343
A Texas LLC which has not registered in New Mexico may not maintain
an action, suit, or proceeding in a New Mexico court until it has registered
in the state. 344 By transacting business in New Mexico without registration,
the Texas LLC appoints the New Mexico Secretary of State as its agent for
service of process for actions arising out of transactions in the state.345 The
failure of the LLC to register does not affect the validity of any act which it
may have taken or contract to which it may have been a party. 346 No mem-
ber or manager of a Texas LLC becomes liable for the debts and obligations
of the entity solely because it transacted business in the State of New Mexico
without first complying with the registration requirements. 347
4. Louisiana
No Texas LLC shall have the right to transact business in Louisiana until
it has procured a certificate of authority from the Louisiana Secretary of
State. 348 Registration involves the payment of a $100 fee 349 and the filing of
two copies of an application for registration, signed by a member (or a man-
ager, if management of the LLC is vested in one or more managers), stating
the LLC's name, date and state of organization, period of duration, regis-
tered agent for service of process in Louisiana, nature of business to be trans-
acted in Louisiana, and related information. 350
No certificate of authority will be issued to a Texas LLC if its name does
not satisfy the requirements of Louisiana law.351 The Louisiana statute re-
quires that the name of each LLC contain either the words "limited liability
company" or the abbreviations "L.L.C." or "L.C.' ' 35 2 This requirement is
more restrictive than the Texas statute which, as amended, also allows the
use of "Limited Company," "Limited," "Ltd.," "LTD," "LLC," and
341. Id. § 50, at 2809 (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-50).
342. Id. § 3, at 2756 (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-3).
343. See TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.02 (amending TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.03, § A(1)).
344. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT, Ch. 280, § 53, 1993 N.M. Laws 2753, 2812 (to
be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-53).
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 2814.
348. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1342 (West Supp. 1993).
349. Id. § 12:1364(B)(1).
350. Id. § 12:1345(A), (B).
351. Id. § 12:1344.
352. Id. § 12:1306(A)(1).
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"LC. ' ' 3 3 Thus, a Texas LLC using these additional words or abbreviations
may be required to modify its name before a certificate of authority will be
granted. 354
A Texas LLC which has not procured a certificate of authority in Louisi-
ana will not be permitted to present a judicial demand before any court of
that state.355 The failure of the LLC to obtain a certificate does not affect
the validity of any act which the LLC may have taken or contract to which
it may have been a party. 35 6 No member or manager of a Texas LLC is
liable for the obligations of the entity solely as a result of the failure to obtain
a certificate of authority. 357
353. See TLLCA Amendments, supra note 189, § 1.02 (amending TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 1528n, Art. 2.03, § A(1)).
354. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1344 (West Supp. 1993).
355. Id. § 12:1354(A).
356. Id. § 12:1354(B).
357. Id.
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